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Davis: Land Use Planning And The Public: Zoning By Initiative

LAND USE PLANNING AND THE PUBLIC: ZONING
BY INITIATIVE
Maxon R. Davis
INTRODUCTION

In this time of heightened environmental concern, people everywhere are demonstrating a greater interest in the use of land in their
communities, in their states, and across the nation. Piqued by what
they perceive as legislative inertia or even antipathy, many such
persons have translated their concerns into direct political action.
One instrument of change available in many states is the initiative,
whereby legislative measures are enacted directly by the electorate.,
The initiative power commonly extends to statutes of state-wide
significance and to local or municipal ordinances.' In terms of land
use, one of the oldest devices for local control is zoning. The United
States Supreme Court has for half a century upheld properly drawn
zoning statutes on the ground that they do not involve a deprivation
of property without due process. 3 So as to avoid the due process
challenge, state zoning statutes universally demand that affected
property owners be given a notice and hearing prior to the enactment of a local zoning ordinance.4 Within the modern political context, a direct conflict then exists between the broad grant of initiative over local ordinances and the statutory command that zoning
ordinances can only be enacted after the requisite notice and hearing. Such powers are "hopelessly inconsistent,"5 and courts passing
on the public's ability to zone by initiative have traditionally denied
it.,
THE HURST DECISION

In Hurst v. City of Burlingamie,7 the California supreme court
1. See, e.g., MONT.CONST. art. V, § 1; art. III, § 4; art. XI, § 8.

2. See, e.g.,

MONT. CONST. art. III, § 4; REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, § 11-1104 (1947)
[hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947].
3. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
4. See, e.g., R.C.M. 1947, § 11-2704.
5. Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134, 277 P. 308, 311 (1929).
6. City of Scottsdale v. Superior Court, 103 Ariz. 204, 439 P.2d 290 (1968); Hurst v. City
of Burlingame, supra note 4; Taschner v. City Council of Laguna Beach, 31 Cal. App. 3d 64,
107 Cal. Rptr. 274 (1973); People's Lobby, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors of the County of Santa
Cruz, 30 Cal. App. 3d 868, 106 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1973); Laguna Beach Taxpayers' Ass'n. v. City
Council, 187 Cal. App. 2d 412, 9 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1960); Korash v. Livonia, 388 Mich. 737,
202 N.W.2d 803 (1972); Forman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs and Markets, Inc., 89 Nev. 533, 516
P.2d 1234 (1974); Smith v. Livingston Twp., 106 N.J. Super. 444, 256 A.2d 85 (1969), aff'd.
54 N.J. 525, 257 A.2d 698 (1969); Dewey v. Doxey-Layton Realty Co., 3 Utah 2d 1, 277 P.2d
805 (1954).
7. Hurst v. City of Burlingame, supra note 4.
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first noted this inconsistency between the zoning laws and the initiative. It concluded: "The Zoning Act is a special statute dealing
with a particular subject and must be deemed to be controlling over
the initiative, which is general in its scope." ' Hurst thus follows the
general rule as to resolutions of conflicting statutes Over the years,
the rationale behind this holding was further developed, to the effect that "the method of enactment is the measure of the power to
act: and that the initiative process used . . .does not conform to
this method."' 0 Courts could not conceive that "the Legislature intended to sanction the enactment of such ordinances by a legislative
process which bypasses the procedural safeguards of the state
law."" As municipalities have no inherent zoning power and as such
authority exists only as a delegation of the state's police power, "the
power must be exercised in the manner stated in the grant and not
otherwise."'" Indeed, the public's use of the initiative to rezone was
seen as a collateral attack on the validity of the very statute by
13
which the power to zone is claimed.
Hurst and its progeny appear to be firmly based in reason. Yet,
the clash between zoning laws and the initiative power reflects more
than inconsistent law-making. Underlying policies are in conflict
too. The procedures outlined in the zoning law-of public hearings
and professional study-are meant to insure not only due process for
individual property owners, but also orderly development for the
community, typically pursuant to a master plan. Thus, "overall
planning would be seriously crippled if the initiative process could
be used in this field."' 4 Such language, though, indicates a preference for government run by experts and for decision-making being
left to representatives or administrators, rather than a lay public
considered untrustworthy. No matter how grounded in experience
such a preference is, it is essentially alien to our democratic principles.'5
8. Id. at 311.
9. Accord, Smith v. Livingston Twp., supra note 5 at 89.
10. Laguna Beach Taxpayer's Ass'n. v. City Council, supra note 5 at 777. See State ex
rel. Powers v. Donohue, 368 S.W.2d 432 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1963).
11. Taschner v. City Council of Laguna Beach, supra note 5 at 227. See 8A MCQUILLEN
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 25.246 (3d ed. 1965).
12. City of Scottsdale v. Superior Court, supra note 5 at 293.
13. Forman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs and Markets, Inc., supra note 5 at 1237-38; Dewey
v. Doxey-Layton Realty Co., supra note 5 at 809.
14. People's Lobby, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors of the County of Santa Cruz, supra
note 5 at 669.
15. See, HAGMAN, LARSON AND MARTIN, CALIFORNIA ZONING PRACTICE, p. 105 (1969).
While Hurst v. City of Burlingame, supra, and Laguna Beach Taxpayers'Ass'n. v.
City Council of Laguna Beach, supra, are clear enough, the implication of the cases
is startling enough that a reexamination might be appropriate. It is inconsistent
with California's broad initiative and home-rule provisions that the state legislature
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THE SAN DIEGO CASE

Recently, the California supreme court distinguished its much
relied upon precedent in Hurst v. City of Burlingame and held by a
4 to 3 margin in San Diego Building Contractors'Associationv. City
8 that the voters of the chartered
Council of the City of San Diego"
city of San Diego could enact a thirty foot building height limitation
on coastal property by means of initiative. While the majority opinion relied on the fact that San Diego was a chartered rather than
general law city as a basis for distinction with Hurst," the Court
went on to find that there was no violation of due process. The
dissent did find a denial of due process, in that the electoral mechanism-even with all its attendant publicity-provided no substitute
for the notice and hearing otherwise afforded affected property owners."8
The San Diego opinion did make much of the fact that the city
was chartered, rather than a general law municipality, whose powers are delegated piecemeal by statute. In California, a charter of a
city "is the supreme law of the state with respect to municipal
affairs."' 9 In San Diego, the grant of initiative in the charter is
broad, with no particular type of ordinance excepted. "Included in
such legislation are zoning ordinances which represent an exercise
of the police power granted cities by California Constitution, article
XI, section 7."10 The requirement elsewhere in the charter of notice
and hearing prior to any action by the Planning Commission on a
zoning proposal was found not to restrict the initiative power. Cases
such as Hurst hinging on the conflict between the state's grant of
initiative and the state's zoning statute for localities were held not
in point. Apparently, though, the older cases do retain vitality for
non-chartered, general law cities in California; and for analagous
situations elsewhere.
Apart from the distinction between chartered and general law
cities, the San Diego decision warrants attention both within and
out of California for other conclusions reached therein. The court
without discussion held that the height limitation-in effect an
amendment to a comprehensive zoning plan-was in essence a
legislative act, therefore properly the subject of an initiative. Furcan enable procedures for enacting local zoning regulations and thus defeat the
constitutional right to local initiatives. (Id.).
16. San Diego Building Contractors Ass'n. v. City Council of the City of San Diego,
Cal.3d __,
529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974). [hereinafter referred to as San Diego].
17. Id. at 571-573.
18. Id. at 579-582.
19. Bayless v. Limber, 26 Cal. App.3d 463, 102 Cal. Rptr. 647, 649 (1972).
20. Id.
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thermore, as noted, the property rights of affected landowners were
not found to have been appropriated without due process of law on
passage of the initiative. Such conclusions-if valid-can lead to a
complete rethinking of the concept and scope of the local zoning
power.
ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGISLATIVE ACTS OF LOCAL BODIES

Initiatives and referendums extend only to legislative actions.2 '
In San Diego, the zoning ordinance at issue was held to be "unquestionably a general legislative act. 2 2 The conclusion so expressed is
not as easily reached as the lack of discussion accompanying it
indicates. Difficulty adheres at the local level in differentiating between administrative and legislative actions, since administrative
and legislative functions of the municipality may be combined in
the same body, typically the city or town council. "An 'ordinance'
might be either legislative or administrative. 2 3 Distinctions in the
increasingly "penumbral area" between the two functions are "inconclusive and flexible. ' 24 The prevailing test is "whether the act
was one creating a new law (legislative) or one executing an already
'
existing law (administrative) . 21

There exists a split of authority with respect to ordinances
amending zoning laws. Clearly, the decision to enact a comprehensive zoning code in the first place is legislative." A subsequent
change concerning a particular property owner is "in substance an
administrative, not legislative, act. ' 27 "The process by which they
are made . . . is basically adjudicatory. ' 2 Such a conclusion depends though on the statutory command of notice and hearing,
"itself recognition of the fact that the decision making process must
be more sensitive to the rights of the individual citizen involved. 218
The underlying rationale again raises the spectre of an unsophisticated public unappreciative of the experts' wisdom: "[I]f each
21. See, e.g., City of Billings v. Nore, 148 Mont. 96, 417 P.2d 458 (1966); Kelley v. John,
162 Neb. 319, 75 N.W.2d 713 (1956); Forman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs and Markets, Inc., supra
note 5.
22. San Diego, supra note 16 at 571.
23. Note, Limitations on Intiative and Referendum, 3 STAN. L. REv., 497, 503 (1951).
24. Note, 5 UTAH L. REv. 413, 415 (1957).
25. City of Billings v. Nore, supra note 21 at 463. Accord, West v. City of Portage, Mich. __,
221 N.W.2d 303 (1974); Forman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs and Markets, Inc., supra
note 5; Denman v. Quin, 116 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); Kiegley v. Bench, 97 Utah
69, 89 P.2d 480 (1939).
26. Accord, West v. City of Portage, supra note 25 at 308; Forman v. Eagle Thrifty
Drugs and Markets, Inc., supra note 5 at 1237.
27. West v. City of Portage, supra note 25 at 309.
28. Fleming v. Tacoma, 81 Wash.2d 292, 502 P.2d 327, 331 (1972).
29. Id.
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change in a zoning classification were to be submitted to a vote of
the city electors, any master plan would be rendered inoperative.
Such changes are administrative acts implementing the comprehensive plan and adjusting it to current conditions."0
Emphasis on the affect of the amendment on the land covered
thereby can lead to a different conclusion:
The ordinance lays down a new rule of conduct as to the use of this
land which every person, including the officials of the city administration, must follow and in no sense, as far as such land is concerned, does it execute or administer a previously enacted law with
respect to it. It was a legislative act performed by a legislative
body . ..
In the absence of a dispositive rule, one is finally forced to a
case by case examination. As more and more land is covered by the
ordinance, the balance shifts toward viewing its enactment as legislative in nature. One can distinguish between the adjudication involved in granting a variance and the policy decision inherent in an
amendment to the plan or code itself.12 "Amendments. . . are legislative. Variances . . ., conditional use permits. . ., and exceptions
are administrative matters. They remain administrative even if
'33
applications for them are heard by the local legislative body.
Given the scope of the ordinance in San Diego-affecting a large
area of coastal property-one comes finally to agree with the court's
view. The initiative involved a fundamental question of policy.
ZONING AND DUE

PROCESS

Zoning ipso facto involves limitations on the use of private
property. Such deprivations have always seemed within the prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the dispensing with notice
and hearing before an initiative has been viewed as "an irreconciliable conflict with the due process clause. '34 Yet, the state frequently
infringes on rights ostensibly within the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment without providing the requisite notice and hearing
demanded with zoning. Taxation, health and safety regulations,
and pollution controls quickly come to mind. Perhaps the special
30. Bird v. Sorenson, 16 Utah 2d 1, 394 P.2d 808 (1964).
31. Hilltop Realty, Inc. v. City of South Euclid, 110 Ohio App. 535, 164 N.E.2d 180,
182 (1960). Accord, Johnson v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal. 2d 826, 323 P.2d 71 (1958); Rhode
Island Home Builders v. Budlong Rose Co., 77 R.I. 147, 74 A.2d 237 (1950).
32. See 5 McQuILLEN MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, §16.55 (3d ed. 1965):
The power to be exercised is legislative in its nature if it prescribes a new policy or
plan; whereas, it is administrative in its nature if it merely pursues a plan already
adopted by the legislative body itself, or some power superior to it. (Id. at 213-214.)
33. CALwORNI ZONING PRACTICE, supra note 15 at 107.
34. City of Scottsdale v. Superior Court, supra note 5 at 293.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1975

5

REVIEW
MONTANA
Montana Law
Review, Vol. LAW
36 [1975],
Iss. 2, Art. 8

[Vol. 36

status of zoning reflects the historically important position of real
property in our legal system. As one observer noted: "Constitutional
suspicion immediately arises when any law, regardless of the mode
of enactment, regulates the use of private property without affording the owner of that property an opportunity, other than his sole
vote, to contest the proposed regulation.""
Prior to San Diego, the California supreme court had considered itself governed by such strictures:
[Ilt is clear that the individual's interest in his property is often
affected by local land use controls, and the "root requirement" of
the due process clause is "that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property
interest, except for extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest . . . justifies postponing the hearing until after
the event ..."I
This language was specifically distinguished in San Diego: The dictum from Scott v. City of Indian Wells here quoted refers to the
situation in which the proceeding is patently adjudicatory and is
mandated by the statute; in such a case, an adjoining property
owner not within the jurisdiction of the municipality was found a
proper participant in the hearing. Scott was held inapplicable in a
determination as to the necessity of such proceedings in the first
place .31
Indeed, if one accepts the premise that the zoning ordinance
sought to be placed before the electorate is legislative in nature,
different ground rules attach.
Due process in law-making is not the same as due process in the
adjudication of controversies. . . .Generally speaking, a hearing
on a legislative matter is held for the purpose of informing the law
makers regarding relevant facts of individual rights, property or
otherwise . . .Unless constitutionally compelled, the requirements for law-making by the legislative process should not be imposed upon lawmaking by the initiative process."
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court bear out this
distinction. Boddie v. Connecticut," relied on in Scott and in San
Diego by the dissent, emphasizes the interest of the individual in
the face of state action. Such concern is central to the idea of due
35. Comment, Zoning by Initiative to Satisfy Local Electorates: A Valid Approach in
California?, 10 CAL. WEs. L. REv. 105, 111 (1973).
36. Scott v. City of Indian Wells, 6 Cal.3d 541, 492 P.2d 1137, 1141, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745
(1972), citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 399 (1971).
37. San Diego, supra note 16 at 577.
38. Bayless v. Limber, supra note 19 at 650-51.
39. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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process;"' yet that interest does not always mandate a notice and
hearing. 4' The Boddie rule is implicitly limited in scope:
Many controversie have raged about the cryptic and abstract
words of the Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that
at a minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.4" (Emphasis added.)
In non-adjudicatory settings, the same requirement does not attach.
"The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible
procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation."4
Following this line, the San Diego majority resurrected a sixty year
old opinion by Justice Holmes in Bi-Metallic Co. v. State Board of
Equalization," in which a unanimous Supreme Court denied the
petitioner's right to a hearing prior to a tax rate increase by the local
authorities." As the San Diego court said, "the authoritative decisions of the United States Supreme Court clearly demonstrate that
the constitutional principle permitting the enactment of legislation
without notice and hearing is as applicable to legislation affecting
the value of real property as to any other legislation.",
Indeed, one remains hard pressed to explain why zoning has
been singled out as such a unique application of the state police
power that the procedural safeguards commonly employed are in
fact necessary. In Hurst, the California supreme court explained:
When the statute requires notice and hearing as to the possible
effect of a zoning law upon property rights the action of the legislative body becomes quasi judicial in character, and the statutory
40. Ross v. Moffit, U.S. , 94 S. Ct. 2437 (1974). "'Due process' emphasizes
fairness between the State and the individual dealing with the State, regardless of how other
individuals in the same situation may be treated." Id. at 2443.
41. Comment, Zoning by Initiative to Satisfy Local Electorates:A Valid Approach in
California?, supra note 35 at 114.
The test expressed by the Scott decision, and suggested by others, suffers from its
limited scope. A test of procedural due process which looks only to the nature or
degree of the deprived interest is not sound when the initiative clashes with private
property rights. (Id.)
42. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
43. Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union, Local 413 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894
(1961).
44. Bi-Metallic Co. v. State Board of Equalization of Colorado, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
45. "Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people, it is impracticable that
everyone should have a direct voice in its adoption. The Constitution does not require all
public acts to be done in town meeting or an assembly of the whole. General statutes within
the state power are passed that affect the person or property of individuals, sometimes to the
point of ruin, without giving them a chance to be heard. Their rights are protected in the
only way that they can be in a complex society, by their power, immediately or remote, over
those who make the rule." Id. at 445.
46. San Diego, supra note 16 at 575.
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notice and hearing then becomes necessary in order to satisfy the
requirement of due process and may not be dispensed with."
Due process is invoked simply because the zoning statute demands
a certain procedure. Such reasoning strikes one as circular. Hurst
seems to state nothing more than that due process is involved because the statute says due process is involved. Were the statute not
to call for notice and hearing, the same state deprivation involved
in a zoning ordinance would not be quasi-judicial. Rather, it would
be legislative, and the same law applying to the same property
which issued from the same legislative body would not violate due
process. One can only conclude that despite the difficulty the
United States Supreme Court has itself evidenced over the years in
coming to grips with due process, the doctrine rests on a more solid
constitutional foundation than indicated in the Hurst opinion. It is
not a creature of statute, applicable whenever a legislature deems
it appropriate. Therefore, proponents of zoning laws are put on notice by San Diego that application of due process in this area awaits
a more logical explanation.
CONCLUSION

The conclusion that one can draw from San Diego is a guarded
one. Other state supreme courts that have faced the question have
found the initiative an improper device for the enactment of zoning
measures." San Diego, too, seems limited to the factual context of
chartered cities in California. Yet, it appears clear that if the conclusions of San Diego are valid, no constitutional infirmity attaches
to zoning through initiative. To say as much does not imply that
notice and hearing are not beneficial. Neither does it imply that
they should be dispensed with, nor that legislatures should not try
to come up with imaginative accomodations between the usual notice and hearing required and the broad grant of the initiative.
Furthermore, small scale zoning changes are not properly subject to initiative. They are in essence administrative, adjudicatory
proceedings. Obviously there exists a grey area between variancetype administrative determinations and wide-scale legislative
changes. It no doubt will remain for the courts to determine where
the line is drawn, if and when initiatives in this area gain a greater
acceptance. For the courts to do so, they must first reach a different
resolution of the conflict between the broad grant of power in the
initiative and the specific procedures in zoning laws. The underlying
policies alone ought to give one pause to reconsider the prevailing
47.
48.

Hurst v. City of Burlingame, supra note 4 at 311.
See cases cited, supra note 5.
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309

view. As San Diego indicates, after that first hurdle, the roadblocks
to direct local decision-making in land use are slight.
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